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Introduction 
In an important article published in African Affairs in 2003, Douglas Rimmer, a 
development economist with over half a century’s experience in West Africa, expressed 
his reservations about economic policies pursued by African governments and their 
international developmental partners. He reviewed the situation in Africa. After hundreds 
of billions of dollars in aid from rich country governments and international development 
organizations, African living standards in 2000 were barely above the levels on 
independence.  Rimmer argued that the problem in Africa was that demand capital was 
low. He opined that it is innovation and not imitation that drives economic development, 
thus investment inputs may not necessarily bring growth. He pointed to the phenomenon 
of graduate unemployment in Africa, where educated labor exceeds the available 
employment opportunities. As against foreign investment, Rimmer argued for free trade 
and emigration as better options for Africa’s development. Educated Africans would 
move to countries of economic opportunity and through remittances shore up economic 
conditions in their countries of origin. With the immigration policies in place in Europe 
and North America, Rimmer doubted western support for massive emigration from 
Africa as an economic strategy. The relevance of international migration and remittances 
for African economies have been noted for the past two decades, though few countries 
have developed coherent policies relating to international migration and development. 
West Africa began to hemorrhage its top civil servants and academic elite in the 
1970s and 1980s, when sharp economic decline set in after the hopeful 1960s. The slump 
in commodity prices in the 1980s was severe enough to undercut the Ivorian miracle, and 
two decades of impressive growth in Côte d’Ivoire came to a grinding halt. Oil exporting 
countries like Nigeria and Cameroon were able to stave off economic malaise for a while, 
but oil squeezed out manufacturing and even Nigeria’s strong cocoa industry as Nigeria 
became solely dependent on oil exports. Economic decline combined with the frequent 
coups of the 1970s and 1980s to create an unstable political economy, a context that was 
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unattractive to West Africa’s professional class. Rado (1986) has commented on how the 
UN and English-speaking countries in the West benefitted from the brain drain of the 
Ghanaian professional class. Ghanaian academics trooped en masse to man the expanding 
tertiary educational system in Nigeria. Nigeria’s expulsion of illegal aliens in 1983 
affected an estimated 900,000 to 1.2 million Ghanaians, and the military government of 
the Provisional National Defence Council was overwhelmed with the economic and 
health needs of this huge returning population (Brydon, 1985). It showed how much 
emigration had taken place below the radar of Ghanaian governments. Kinship networks, 
strained by economic decline, drought and food shortages in 1983 proved unable to 
assimilate returning kinsmen and women. From available research and anecdotal 
evidence, a significant proportion of the returnees had found their way out of Ghana 
within a matter of months, emphasizing how important international migration had 
become to individual and family strategies of economic survival. In 2000 it is estimated 
that between 30 and 50% of science and technology professionals from the developing 
world now live in the industrialized countries (Merz, Chen and Geithner, 2007: 12). 
International remittances caught the attention of African governments from the 
1990s. By the mid-1990s, the amounts were significant enough to include the Ghanaian 
“diaspora” within the political community, and politicians in the Fourth Republic traveled 
to Europe and North America on political campaigns for financial support.1 Ghana 
Statistical Service issued its first specialized publication in 1995 on international 
migration and its potential for human capital formation and capital accumulation. In 2003 
Ghanaian remittances reached US$1.9 billion, displacing cocoa and gold as the country’s 
leading source of foreign exchange.2 Nigeria in 2006 reported US$4.2 billion in 
remittances, a 30% increase from 2005 (Oroczo and Mills, 2007). It is believed that 
remittances into Ghana, Ivory Coast and Nigeria at least equal or have overtaken Foreign 
Direct Investment and far exceed official development assistance, and have become an 
                                                        
1 Diasporas originate in forced or involuntary migrations and are often disconnected from the homeland. 
The recent dispersions and the new immigrant communities that have emerged globally are more 
appropriately “transnational communities.” But the common use of “diaspora” for these communities have 
gained currency, and in this regard the definition by Merz, Chen and Geithner (2007: 2) would be 
appropriate: “By diaspora we refer broadly to communities of individuals residing and working outside 
their country of origin. These individuals often maintain social, financial, and cultural connections to their 
country of origin usually mediated through family and friends In the homeland. 
2 Fiona Ledger, “Africa’s hidden aid,” BBC Focus on Africa (July-Sept. 2004) 
important source of foreign exchange. From World Bank statistics, remittances to Africa 
reached US$20 billion in 2007 (Devarjan and Shetty, 2010). 
There is another important recent statistic where Africa’s economies are 
concerned. In the last decade or so, 6 of the world’s fastest growing economies have been 
in Africa: Angola, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Chad, Mozambique and Rwanda. In 8 of the past 10 
years Africa has grown faster than Asia (Zachary, 2012). Some point to the commodity 
boom that has been triggered by demand from China and India for Africa’s oil and 
mineral exports, but robust growth in Africa has even been reported in agricultural 
countries such as Ethiopia, which grew at 7.5% in 2011. A growth in Africa’s technical 
and managerial expertise has been noted in the past decade as well, and World Bank 
officials have pointed to competent policies put in place that minimized the impact of the 
2007-8 global financial crises on Africa (Devarjan and Shetty, 2010). Foreign Direct 
Investment in Africa grew steadily from US$36b in 2006 to $53b in 2007, and $88b in 
2008 despite global financial crises, and leading financial houses even in the United 
States are reviewing their estimation of Africa. The past decade has also witnessed a 
brain gain for Africa, as many highly educated African professionals and entrepreneurs 
have returned to their home countries or other African countries. Yet very few African 
countries have coherent policies linking international migration, reverse migration, 
remittances and economic development. What I want to do in the rest of this paper is to 
reflect on diasporas and development, to discuss the key issues that have emerged in this 
area of study, especially relating to countries such as Mexico, the Philippines, India and 
China for whom international migration and remittances have been key, and to draw on 
these insights to interrogate the potential of the recent African dispersions in Africa’s 
economic growth and development. The literature is inconclusive on whether remittances 
in Africa generally aid wealth creation or poverty reduction. I will draw on the Ghanaian 
data from this collaborative IDRC project to engage this question, noting in particular 
gendered dimensions such as the role of women in providing household subsistence and 
their increasing prominence as migrants in their own right. 
 
Diaspora and Development: Defining Issues 
 Whereas the focus on diaspora in Africa has been on remittances, diaspora flows 
and exchanges include commercial investment and philanthropy, as well as intangible 
aspects such as knowledge, contacts and values. A key question at the center of the recent 
global diasporas is whether global equity can be an inevitable consequence of diaspora 
transfers or whether these flows could rather aggravate inequity? What has been the 
connection between the large and historic Asian diasporas and the recent impressive 
economic growth in China and India? It is worth noting that China and India are at the 
top of remittance receiving countries in the world: according to the World Bank-IMF 
estimates for formal flows India received US$21.7 billion in 2004 and China US$21.3 
billion. Aside from migrant remittances, it is widely known that the overseas Chinese 
communities who had developed successful business opportunities in regions like 
Southeast Asia were also effective in establishing massive new investments in mainland 
China, after the People’s Republic of China launched its economic reforms in the late 
1970s (De Ferranti and Ody, 2007; Gungwu, 1993). On a comparatively smaller scale, 
the expertise of expatriate Indians has also been credited as central to the recent 
development of India’s software industry. 
The ineffectiveness of many states in developing countries to promote equitable 
development has made diaspora interventions welcome, though the state cannot be 
allowed to take a backseat in this regard. Diaspora contributions for social and public 
purposes may have a pro-equity bias. The Indian state has been particularly encouraging 
of diaspora giving, especially in the areas of high technology, medical and higher 
education. Special tax exemptions exist for organizations involved in the delivery of 
public services connected to education and health or in sectors considered to be of 
national or regional importance. One hundred percent deductions under the Income Tax 
Act are possible for certain projects specified by the government and for scientific, social 
science or statistical research institutions (Sidel, 2007). Such initiatives though 
contributing to growth in the receiving country can still be anti-equity. Instances where 
diaspora elites work in tandem with wealthy philanthropists or investors at home can 
generate results that are beneficial to elite groups in the home country and diaspora but 
work against equity at home. In the Indian and Chinese diasporas, substantial effort and 
investment have gone into the building of major diaspora-funded medical institutions and 
business schools recently, such as the Indian School of Business in Hyderabad. These 
institutions of higher learning or highly specialized medical institutions cater to the 
interests of a few elite groups at home and abroad, and though a plus to the nation’s 
economy do not necessarily contribute to equity, and such initiatives may indeed weaken 
the government’s pro-equity measures (Sidel 2007). 
Most diaspora giving or philanthropy is modest in scale, though there are some 
countries that have explored diasporic philanthropy to good effect, such as Mexico. 
Through its “Three-for-One” policy, the Mexican state matches the giving of diasporic 
communities for hometown development, creating an incentive for hometown 
associations abroad to invest in their communities and providing the state with reliable 
development partner committed to local communities. The Philippine government in 
2005-6 went on roadshows in various American and European cities under an initiative 
called “My Country, My Home.” They showcased several opportunities for Filipino 
abroad to invest at home under the label “hometown development” (Sidel, 2007). In one 
major pro-equity initiative, the US-based Ayala Foundation has mobilized funds from the 
Filipino community in the US with support from the government of the Philippines in a 
project called Gearing Up Literacy and Access for Students (GILAS), which seeks to put 
computer labs with internet access in all the 5,789 public high schools in the Philippines 
(Sidel, 2000). In Africa Mali, before its recent political collapse, and Burundi both match 
funds remitted by the diaspora for local development projects (Okome, 2007; Baruah, 
2006). The Ghanaian government seemed to have taken a page from these examples. It is 
currently putting together a migration policy under the leadership of a National Migration 
Unit. In mid-2012 it organized a homecoming conference, but not with individual 
potential investors such as the homecoming summit organized by the Kufuor government 
in 2001. The government targeted hometown associations from five countries in Europe 
and North America. The Ghanaian government with its eye to local or hometown 
development is targeting these hometown associations hoping to facilitate their individual 
investments in Ghana as well as their philanthropic giving to community projects. Aware 
that the bulk of remittances through the money transfer institutions such as 
Western Union, MoneyGram and Vigo among others come in the form of modest 
amounts to relatives to supplement household income, the government is trying to 
get members of hometown associations, discouraged by the common incidence of 
embezzlement of monies for projects, to consider the government as a partner in 
personal and community investment. This would protect members of hometown 
associations from the misuse of funds sent for real estate and business projects, 
bring in larger remittances central to the national supply of foreign exchange, and 
direct community development in meaningful ways.3 
Under both National Democratic Congress (NDC) and New Patriotic Party (NPP) 
governments in the past two decades, Ghana has explored myriad strategies aimed at 
connecting the diaspora more firmly to its developmental agenda. It was perhaps the first 
West African country to pass dual citizenship laws in the 1990s in an amendment to its 
1992 Constitution. It was among the first under the NPP administration of 2001-8 to 
create a Ministry for Diaspora Affairs appending this to Tourism. At the beginning of the 
Kufuor regime it began putting together the infrastructure for what it called a “skills 
bank.” Ghanaians overseas were encouraged to register through online databases with 
their various embassies and list their areas of expertise and the times of the year they 
could be available to work for the country at cost or pro buono. This initiative took 
cognizance of the fact that there are many skilled professionals, such as scientists, who 
may find it impossible to pursue their specialized occupations in Ghana if they require 
special laboratories and other expensive equipment. There is the example of the 
American Association of Physicians of Indian Origin (AAPI), representing 41,000 Indian 
doctors in the United States (Sidel, 2004). They are able to pool their quite substantial 
resources in dialogue with the Indian government about the provision of healthcare. To 
expect some of these professionals to relocate home may be naïve, but their sense of 
patriotism, especially first generation migrants, could motivate them to sign on for short 
tours of duty in areas of strategic importance to the countries of their birth. This 
connection may even become more important with second generations Africans born in 
North America or Europe, perhaps with even more higher and specialized education than 
their parents, but with more diluted ties to the African countries of their parents. This is 
where dual citizenship could retain the partial loyalty of this new generation. The World 
Bank has noted the growing financial competence with which some African countries 
                                                        
3 Interview with David Agorsor, head of National Migration Unit, Accra, July 13, 2012. 
have dealt with the financial recession of 2007-8, and the growth in technical and 
managerial expertise in Africa in the past decade or so. Though some evidence exists 
about a growing tide of returning professional migrants, studies are yet to connect this 
with the possible growth in Africa’s technocratic skills. 
Remittances have been a welcome but still largely unknown asset to many 
African governments. Defined as “private resources earned by migrants and sent 
predominantly to relatives for private consumption in their home country of origin” 
(Merz, Chen and Geithner, 2007), the private nature of these transfers makes it difficult 
to assess their impact within the domestic economy. Nevertheless, remittances have 
several positive public externalities: they can strengthen a country’s foreign exchange 
reserves, improve its credit worthiness, enhance access to international capital, and help 
reduce poverty. In acknowledgment of these positive public externalities government 
such as Mexico and India have simplified and enhanced financial services and banking to 
facilitate remittances and to increase access to financial services for the poor. Some states 
have lessened or ended taxes on philanthropic remittances, reporting requirements and 
other legal barriers. Philanthropic remittances are yet to gain prominence in Africa and 
thus attract such enabling policies. Uganda was cited recently as the only African country 
that makes available treasury bills and bonds to migrants (Okome, 2007). To take the 
example of Ghana, the nature of remittances as reported to the Bank of Ghana makes a 
disaggregated understanding of these flows difficult and consequently undercuts targeted 
policy measures. The Bank of Ghana is able to capture workers’ remittances currently, 
which is defined by the IMF as workers who have lived abroad for more than a year and 
who send money home regularly for private purposes. To go beyond this broad category 
would require end use surveys of the sort IIAS carried out earlier this year. This would 
then inform the bank’s understanding of the variegated impacts of remittance and how 
introduce instrumental policies.4 In the absence of this, Sidel (2007: 30) recommends that 
the state “improve the climate for everyone,” providing a favorable policy environment 
“for domestic and diaspora actors alike.” 
 
 
                                                        
4 Personal communication from Nii-Sowah Ahulu, Bank of Ghana, December 18, 2012. 
A Gendered Reading of Household Use of Remittances in Akuapem South District    
As part of its collaborative IDRC-funded project on “International Remittances, 
Poverty and Inequality in West Africa, the International Institute of Advanced Studies in 
Ghana pursued an exit survey at money transfer institutions in the district capital of the 
Akuapem South district of Nsawam in December 2010, followed by a household survey 
of remittances and consumption patterns from April 2012. Based on the year 2000 
population and housing census in the country, the total population of the Akuapem 
South district was 116,344, made up of 49.3% male and 50.7% female with urban 
population accounting for 45.7%. On the basis of intercensoral population growth of 
2.5% between 2000 and 2010 (only provisional figures of the 2010 population and 
housing census have been released) the district population is expected to reach 
149,037.  Nsawam is the largest town in the Akuapem South district and the center 
of administration. According to the 2000 census, Nsawam’s population stood at 
29,986 with 2304 houses and 6947 households. The latter figure reflects the 
multiple households that share a house. The average size of a household is 4.3. An 
old trading town, Nsawam has a vibrant commercial sector, and its financial or 
banking institutions serve the surrounding countryside. These include Ghana 
Commercial Bank, Citizens Rural Bank, Akuapem Rural Bank, and South Akim Rural 
Bank. With the exception of Ghana Commercial Bank, the other three banks – 
together with the post office -- also serve as agents for Western Union, while Ghana 
Commercial Bank is the agent for MoneyGram.  The town is well represented in 
terms of the location of educational and health facilities in the district. 
The literature is divided on how remittances impact income inequality: some 
authors contend that remittances reduce income inequalities; others argue the 
remittances rather aggravate income inequalities considering that it is the rich 
rather than the poor that engage in international migration and enjoy the receipt of 
financial flows. For the African context, research has noted that richer households 
tend to participate in international migration to non-African destinations, whereas 
poorer households feature more prominently in intra-continental migration. 
Though remittances from inter-continental migrants tend to be on average ten 
times larger than intra-continental remittances and accrue to already better-off 
households, intra-African remittances reduce inter-household inequality 
considering that they flow to poorer households (Wourtese, 2008). In the Ghanaian 
context, Adams (2006) who compared national, international and inter-continental 
migration also discovered that international remittances reduce the severity of 
poverty more than internal remittances because of the differential impact of these 
two types of remittances on poor households. Households in the poorest decile 
group receive 22.7 percent of their total household expenditure (income) from 
international remittances, as opposed to only 13.8 percent of such income from 
internal remittances. When these “poorest of the poor” households receive 
international remittances, their income status changes dramatically and this in turn 
have a large effect on any poverty measure like the squared poverty gap which 
considers both the number and distance of poor households beneath the poverty 
line.  Our interest is in examining the dynamics of remittances and their use by 
females, who are more socially vulnerable, and who are overwhelmingly 
represented in the informal economy. 
Our exit survey was administered to 219 recipients who collected 
remittances from the four Western Union and one MoneyGram agencies in Nsawam. 
With more agencies, Western Union accounted for 163 (74.4%) of remittances 
received. Remittances came largely from relatives (siblings – about 33%, spouses – 
17%, children – 17%) and only 28 per cent reported receiving remittances from 
non-relatives.  Females formed a larger category of recipients (58%) than men 
(42%). Much of what was received subsidized household expenditure and played 
important roles in funding education, and building repair or construction. In terms 
of poverty status of recipients, the exit survey showed that less than 10% claim to 
be poor as against 47% who claim to be neither poor nor non-poor and 43% being 
non poor. The effect of remittances on poverty was found to be significantly positive 
judging from the claim of less than 1% that remittances have not improved their 
poverty status. Specifically, about 63% of recipients reported that receiving 
remittances greatly improved their poverty status compared with 29% and 7% who 
claim that their poverty status has improved moderately and to a limited extent 
respectively. Less than 1% claim that their poverty status has not been positively 
affected by remittances.   
 The household survey from April 2012, which covered a wider area, enabled 
us to situate the findings from Nsawam within the larger context of the Akuapem 
South district. The household survey covered 20 enumeration areas, and we 
selected 15 households in each giving us a total number of 300 households with 950 
household members. The 2000 census gives us an urban population of 49% for the 
district and a rural population of 51%. One hundred and sixty-seven of our 300 
households (55%) were urban, and 136 (45%) were rural.5 Of the 300 households, 
74 (24.70%) received remittances, while 226 (75.30%) received none. Of the 135 
rural households, only 27 (20%) received remittances, compared to 47 (28.60%) 
out of the 165 urban households. International migration while significant in rural 
and urban South Akuapem district cannot be described as overwhelming. But this, 
perhaps, puts more emphasis on the value of remittances in reducing poverty in 
receiving households, and in increasing income inequality between receiving and 
non-receiving households. Of the total amount of GH¢122,249 (Ghana cedis or about 
US$64,999 at the present rate of US$1 to GH¢1.9) received through remittances in 
the 12 months before April 2012, GH¢89,298 accrued to urban households and 
GH¢32,951 to rural households, confirming the urban bias documented in 
remittances where the literature is concerned. For both rural and urban households 
receiving remittances, consumption came first in the ranking of value of remittances 
expenditure, accounting for GH¢21,270 in rural households (64.55% of expenditure) 
and GH¢45,572 (51.03%) in urban households, a combined total of GH¢66,842 
(54.68%) of all household expenditure. Building projects ranked a distant second 
(13.54%) in terms of all expenditure, being numerically more significant in the 
urban areas than the rural ones. What is clear from the combined evidence from the 
exit survey and household survey is the basic nature of remittances as a subsidy to 
livelihoods, as seen in the large percentage of expenditure that goes to consumption 
                                                        
5 We added three extra households in the survey in case of incorrect returns to 
ensure that we had our sample of 300 households. 
at the household level. From the Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS), one can see 
across the country the large percentage of expenditure that goes to food.  
 We noted that large category of female recipients of remittances in our exit 
survey. These may be spouses of mothers left home to manage families. The 
traditional role of women in providing domestic subsistence may help to explain the 
prominent use of remittances in consumption. According to the International Labor 
Organization more women in Africa are migrating, accounting for about 47% of 
migrants in Africa (Okome, 2007). We have noted how intra-African migrants are 
often from poorer households, and we may be witnessing a particularly gendered 
dimension to female migration and remittance patterns aimed at the welfare of 
economically vulnerable family and female networks. 
 
